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   Public Debt and the Limits of Fiscal Policy to Increase
Economic Growth




Research that seeks to estimate the effects of ﬁscal policies on economic growth has ignored the
role of public debt in this relationship. This study proposes a theoretical model of endogenous growth,
which demonstrates that the level of the public debt-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio should
negatively impact the effect of ﬁscal policy on growth. This occurs because government indebtedness
extracts part of the savings of the young to pay interest on the debts of the older generation, who are no
longer saving. Therefore, the payment of debt interest assumes an allocation exchange role between
generations that is similar to a pay-as-you-go pension system, which results in changes in the savings
rate of the economy. The major conclusions of the theoretical model were tested using an econometric
model to provide evidence for the validity of this conclusion. Our empirical analysis controls for time-
invariant, country-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the growth rates. We also address endogeneity issues and
allow for heterogeneity across countries in the model parameters and for cross-sectional dependence.
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This article examines how the size of the public debt-to-GDP ratio limits the effects of productive govern-
ment expenditures on long-term growth. We conducted this analysis by proposing a model with overlap-
ping generations and endogenous growth, wherein the government can go into debt in order to increase
its productive expenditures. Various works present models where public expenditures affect growth via a
framework of endogenous growth (Barro, 1990; Chen, 2006; Devarajan et al., 1996; Glomm and Raviku-
mar, 1997), wherein the effect of these expenditures varies according to their nature, their composition,
and the size of the tax burden. Other works demonstrate that public debt can negatively affect growth
(Brauninger, 2005; Saint-Paul, 1992). In this article, we establish a link between these two classes of
models and demonstrate that the effect of productive expenditures on growth is limited not only by the
size of the tax burden and the rate of indebtedness, as predicted by these models, but also by the debt-to-
GDP ratio.
Similar to the models of Barro (1990) and Saint-Paul (1992), the model that we propose here demon-
strates that an increase in public expenditures can have three direct effects on growth. An increase in
public expenditure positively affects economic productivity but at the expense of the negative effects that
are associated with the increases in the tax burden and public indebtedness in order to ﬁnance the expen-
ditures, which result in a decrease in savings; however, in our approach, we demonstrate that there is an
additional indirect effect: an increase in productive expenditures results in an increase in the equilibrium
interest rate due to the increase in productivity. This results in an increase in expenditures for interest
rate on public debt and an additional reduction in savings. This occurs because government indebtedness
extracts part of the savings of the young to pay interest on the debts of the older generation, who are
no longer saving. Therefore, the payment of debt interest assumes an allocation exchange role between
generations that is similar to a pay-as-you-go pension system, which results in changes in the savings rate
of the economy.
In the second part of the article, we will estimate a growth equation using the speciﬁcation proposed
by the theoretical model for a panel of countries to provide valid evidence for the conclusions of the
theoretical model. Our empirical analysis controls for time-invariant, country-speciﬁc heterogeneity in
the growth rates. We also address endogeneity issues and allow for heterogeneity across countries in the
model parameters and for cross-sectional dependence.
Various studies have found empirical evidence that the allocation of public funds towards education,
health, and infrastructure expenses positively impact economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Easterly and
Rebelo, 1993; Gupta et al., 2005); however, there is no consensus regarding this issue, as many works ﬁnd
insigniﬁcant results (Agell et al., 2006; Devarajan et al., 1996). We suggest that the disagreement among
these works can be reconciled by taking a closer look at the theory. We used a speciﬁed theoretical model
that clariﬁes the proper non-linear speciﬁcation of our growth regression and allows us to demonstrate
that by disregarding the role of public debt in this relationship, the estimations that are used in previous
studies can result in omitted variable bias. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence that the magnitude of the effect
of public debt in this context is considerable.
22 Theoretical Model
In this section, a simple overlapping generations model of endogenous economic growth will be devel-
oped, wherein it is established that public expenditures can affect economic productivity. The model is
an extension of Barro (1990) and Glomm and Ravikumar (1997) in that the government can become
indebted in order to increase its productive expenditures.
2.1 Agents
If an overlapping generations model in which each generation lives for two periods and consists of a
continuum of identical individuals in the interval (0;1) is considered, the utility function of an agent who







i is consumption in the period i of the individual who is born in t and 0 <  < 1. The initial gen-
eration of older people is endowed with k0 units of capital. The following generations are each endowed





t  (1   )wt; (2)
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t+1)  0; (4)
where st
t = kt+1 + dt+1 is savings and dt are government bonds that are owned by private agents. Each
individual takes the wage rate, wt, the real interest rate, rt+1, and the tax rate, , as given. Clearly, one
unit of labor is inelastically supplied by each young individual and no old individual wishes to save.
2.2 Firms
There is a representative ﬁrm that attempts to maximize its proﬁts in an environment of perfect competi-






where yt is the output, zt are the productive government expenditures, that is, the expenditures that affect
the marginal product of capital, and kt is the capital stock that is rented by the ﬁrm following the law of
accumulation kt+1 = (1   )kt + it, where  is the depreciation rate and it is the level of investment. For
simplicity, let us assume  = 1. This production function is identical to Barro’s (1990) if we assume that
the labor supply is the same as the size of the younger generation, i.e., one. In turn, the government limits
3the quantity of productive expenditures as a part of the aggregate product.
zt = xyt (6)







Therefore, the economy’s production function exhibits constant marginal returns for capital, despite
the fact that the returns for ﬁrms are decreasing. This is a result of the externality of productive gov-
ernment expenditures. The ﬁrm does not perceive that by increasing capital stock (and consequently the
product), there will be an increase in productive spending by the government, and this leads to an increase
in the marginal products of labor and capital.
2.3 Government
The government spends a ﬁxed fraction 0 < g < 1 of the product on its consumption and also spends a
fraction x and charges a tax rate  on the income of the agents. In addition, it borrows resources from the
private sector by issuing bonds dt that pay a remuneration of rt+1 in the following period, where d0 = 0.
Therefore, changes in government debt are expressed as the primary deﬁcit (g + x)yt   wt added to the
debt service payments rtdt.
dt+1   dt = rtdt + (g + x)yt   wt (8)
Inorderforthegovernmenttomeetitsbudgetaryrestrictions, wehavetoassumethatsomecomponent
of the government budget is endogenous, serving as an adjusted variable. Thus, we will assume that the
government always adjusts its indebtedness to satisfy its budgetary restriction. This is relevant because
we are assuming that each time that the government decides to increase its expenditures, it also decides
to increase its indebtedness. For the case of study in this manuscript, speciﬁcally, productive government
expenditures, we observe that governments increase the product by raising productivity; however, their
increase results in a larger deﬁcit, such that productive expenditures have a limited effect on the economy
because they are ﬁnanced by increases in the public debt.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium





t=0 and prices fwt;rtg1
t=0, such that:
1. Given wt and rt+1, the allocation (ct
t;ct
t+1;st
t) resolves the maximization problem for the young
generation t.
42. Given wt and rt, the allocation (yt;kt) resolves the maximization problem for the representative
ﬁrm,
3. st
t = kt+1 + dt+1,
4. yt = ct
t + c
t 1
t + kt+1 + gyt + xyt.
The solution to the optimization problem for the younger generation in period t yields:
s
t
t = (1   )wt=(1 + ) (9)














and, given that the technology exhibits constant returns to scale with the private factors, economic proﬁt















Therefore, because productive government expenditures affect the productivity of the economy, they
naturally also affect interest rates and wages. Since the present model is represented in the AK form,
savings affect long-term growth. Equation (9) demonstrates that shocks to the equilibrium wage lead to
greater savings, and equation (11) makes it clear that shocks to productive government expenditures(11)
increase the wage level. Therefore, increases in productive expenditures lead to permanent productivity
shocks and salary increases. This produces an increase in savings, investments, and subsequently, in
economic growth.
However, it is important to note that in (9), the savings increase depends negatively on , as this
decreases the net gain of the productivity increase. This result is consistent with that obtained by Barro
(1990), in that increases in productive expenditures depend in a non-linear way on the size of government.



























d k ˆ , ˆ
Initially, we will assume that there is a stable equilibrium in the economy or that dt
kt is constant. In
this case, equation (12) demonstrates the dynamic equilibrium of capital and, consequently, that of the
product. There are three components in the right-hand side of the equation that show us the three paths
by which an increase in productive government expenditures can affect growth.
The ﬁrst part of the equation demonstrates that an increase in productive expenditures increases
growth, which reﬂects their impact on the economy’s productivity by increasing aggregate savings and
economic growth; however, once again, the size of this effect decreases as the size of the tax burden
increases.
The second component of the equation will be zero if the primary deﬁcit in relation to the GDP
[g + x   (1   )] is zero. This component also shows that the marginal effect of productive govern-
ment expenditures varies depending on the primary deﬁcit. This demonstrates that when the government
increases its productive expenditures, such as in education, infrastructure, or health, there is a negative
effect on growth because it directly increases government indebtedness and reduces the savings that is
designated for private investment.
The third component of the equation reproduces the indirect impact that productive government ex-
penditures have on indebtedness and, therefore, on growth. Because increases in x raise the interest rate
and because the government pays interest rate on public debt, an increase in productive expenditures
impacts the costs of the debt, which indirectly raises the rate of government indebtedness. Thus, as the
public debt increases in size, this relationship becomes more perverse such that productive expenditures
will have a lower marginal effect on growth.
6Figure 2: Increase in Government Consumption (g)











7Models with budgetary equilibrium, as found in Barro (1990); Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), only
provide results for the ﬁrst part of the equation. The second component of the equation follows the same
logic as the models of debt and endogenous growth that are found in Saint-Paul (1992), wherein increases
in the public debt lead to greater indebtedness, which decreases the amount of savings that is allocated to
capital accumulation. In our approach, we ﬁnd an additional effect (the third part of the equation) where
the size of the debt becomes relevant. We can understand this effect as being similar to a pay-as-you-go
pension system, in that a portion of the savings of the young is reallocated to pay the older generation
(through greater debt interest payments) instead of on the accumulation of capital, thereby diminishing
economic growth.
Thus, the magnitude of the impact of an increase in productive expenditures on economic growth
varies based on the size of the primary deﬁcit and the public debt. In other words, it is more likely that
increases in infrastructure, education, and health expenditures, or any other productive expenditures, will
stimulate economic growth when the unproductive portion of the government and the debt-to-GDP ratio
are lower.
In order to verify and characterize whether there is a steady-state equilibrium in the economy, we have














Thus, for the growth rates of kt and dt to be constant, or rather, so that there is an equilibrium, the
ratio dt=kt needs to be constant, such that kt+1=kt = dt+1=dt. By setting equations (12) and (13) equal to







































Thus, if the solution above possesses at least one real positive root, there is a steady-state equilibrium.
Naturally, the existence of an equilibrium depends on the values of the model parameters, and as demon-
strated exhaustively by Brauninger (2005), an equilibrium is not always obtained for plausible parameter
values.
In Figure 1, where ^ k and ^ d are the capital and debt growth rates, equations (12) and (13) are plotted
in an example where we assume that the two roots are real and positive and [g + x   (1   )] > 0.
In Figure 1, we have a result with two equilibriums: the ﬁrst, which is characterized by a low debt-
capital ratio, a low debt-GDP ratio, and high economic growth, is locally stable, whereas the second,
which is characterized by low growth and a high debt-to-GDP ratio, is unstable.
8In Figure 2, we evaluate a scenario in which an economy in equilibrium experiences an increase in
unproductive government expenditures (g). In this case, the capital growth curve shifts downwards and
the debt growth curve shifts upwards. If the economy is initially in a state of stable equilibrium with high
growth, this leads to a decline in steady-state economic growth and an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
In an extreme situation with an excessive increase in unproductive expenditures, the two curves no longer
intersect, meaning that the growth rate of debt would be larger than that of the economy and suggesting an
explosive increase in debt and an absolute collapse of the economy. This would be the case if there were
no steady-state equilibrium. This result is essentially the same as that obtained by Brauninger (2005).
However, the case that most interests us, and for which this article attempts to make a contribution,
is that of increases in productive government expenditures. This case is illustrated in Figure 3. With an
increase in productive expenditures (x), the slopes of the two curves change. In this example, where the
economy is in a stable steady-state, economic growth increases, as does the debt-to-GDP ratio. This
occurs because the ﬁscal cost of increasing this type of spending is still small in comparison to the
resulting productivity gains. Consequently, the economy still has the necessary ﬁscal strength, and this
type of policy is very successful; however, at an equilibrium with a high debt-to-GDP ratio, the effect
on growth and the increase in productive expenditures will be less substantial, and the effect on the debt-
capital ratio is uncertain because it will depend on the slopes of the curves, which are determined by other
model parameters.
There are at least two important conclusions that we can extract from this model. The ﬁrst is that con-
trary to the models that have been developed thus far, such as those in Saint-Paul (1992) and Brauninger
(2005), increases in the debt-to-GDP ratio may be linked to increases in the growth rate under certain
circumstances. The second is that the marginal effect on growth that is caused by productive expendi-
tures, such as those on infrastructure, education, and health, depends on both the primary surplus of the
government and the size of the debt. Therefore, the econometric speciﬁcations that have been used until
now to examine the effects of these policies on growth, which ignore these non-linearities, may suffer
from omitted variable bias.
2.5 Optimum Productive Expenditures
By differentiating equation (12) with respect to x, holding dt
kt constant,1 and setting it equal to zero, and
performing some manipulations, we arrive at the optimum value xc,
x









As in Barro (1990); Glomm and Ravikumar (1997), there is an optimum size of productive govern-
ment expenditures relative to GDP that maximizes the growth rate of the economy. When government
expenditures are below (above) this value, an increase in these expenditures has a positive (negative) ef-
fect on growth.2 Nevertheless, in contrast to the results that were found by the aforementioned authors,
1This is a partial equilibrium analysis because dt
kt is an endogenous variable in the model.
2This is valid if
n





9this value is not equal to the productivity parameter of public spending (1   ). This is a result of our
assumption that only one component of government revenue is transformed into productive expenditures,
and so xc is less than (1   )3. When the economy is in a steady-state, this will be the same value that is
needed for the economy to change and remain in equilibrium.
According to equation (14), one notes that this critical x depends on various parameters of the econ-
omy. For example, it can be observed that in countries where the agents are more patient, a larger , and
when the productivity of government expenditures (1   ) is higher, the critical x is higher. In contrast,
for countries in which the government has more unproductive spending g or a high debt-to-capital ratio,
the critical x is lower. With regard to the tax rate, the effect depends on the parameters of the economy.
3 Empirical Evidence
The theoretical model predicts that the relationship between economic growth and productive government
expenditures is negatively correlated with the public debt, the tax burden, and the primary deﬁcit. If
these conclusions are correct, growth models that depend on public expenditures but do not take such
interactions into account will suffer from omitted variable bias. In this section, an empirical model is
suggested to provide evidence for the validity of these conclusions.
The various empirical problems that have been outlined in growth econometrics will be considered in
order to provide adequate empirical evidence. In particular, it is necessary to address the likely problems
of parameter heterogeneity, cross-section dependence, endogeneity, and time-invariant, country-speciﬁc
heterogeneity (Bond et al., 2010; Durlauf et al., 2005).
In a certain sense, the non-linear nature of a model that includes the interactions of key variables may
resolve a large part of the heterogeneity of the parameters if the theoretical model is correct; however,
it is likely that other institutional aspects, such as corruption and bureaucracy, can affect the productive
expenditures coefﬁcient in the growth equation. Therefore, following the same strategy that was adopted
by Bond et al. (2010); Gemmell et al. (2011); Lee et al. (1997), which involves growth regressions using
a panel that is similar to ours, we will use the mean group approach of Pesaran and Smith (1995) to
attempt to resolve the heterogeneity of the parameters. At the same time, as it is likely that the countries
suffer from cross-section dependence in the shocks of the growth process, we will use the multifactor
error structure proposed by Pesaran (2006).
These methods require the use of a series of annual country growth data. This approach is possible
in our case because the growth and ﬁscal data vary from year to year4. A possible problem of utilizing
annual data for growth studies is the possibility that the results reﬂect ﬂuctuations in the series and not
ﬂuctuations in the long-term. Following Bond et al. (2010), we rely on dynamic econometric speciﬁ-
cations to implicitly ﬁlter out these higher-frequency inﬂuences, while acknowledging the limitations of
this approach.
3Considering g = 0 and d = 0, it is easy to show that xc = (1   )
4If the series that are used contain data that are not annual frequency averages (e.g., human capital), do not vary in an-
nual frequency (e.g., political systems), do not vary over time (e.g., colonial origins), or vary little over time (e.g., income
inequality), this method may not be appropriate. For further discussion, see Bond et al. (2010); Durlauf et al. (2005)
10Using panel data for countries, we use a speciﬁcation where growth depends on its lagged values, in
addition to the variables of interest, in a linear version of the parameters based on (12). Because (12)
is no longer an equilibrium equation, an alternative would be to simultaneously estimate this with (13);
however, given that there is no variable in (13) that is not present in (12), this approach does not help
us identify the equation. Therefore, we opt to estimate (12) using a two-step GMM. Nonetheless, we
recognize that this is not an equilibrium relationship but is, rather, only a veriﬁcation of whether the
relationship that is predicted by the model has some basis in the data. Therefore, the regression model is
deﬁned by
grit = 0 +
T X
s=1
sgrit s + 0xit 1 + 1xit 1  it 1 + 2xit 1  surplusit 1 +
+3xit 1  dit 1=yit 1 + 4dit 1=yit 1 + "i + t + eit (15)
where grit is the per capita GDP growth rate, which is expressed as a percentage, of country i in year t,
and T is the number of lags of the dependent variable that is included among the explanatory variables.
The variables of interest are xit and its interaction with the tax burden, debt, and primary surplus. The
variable xit is the sum of the central government expenditures for the country, such as those for educa-
tion, transportation, communication, energy, and health, divided by the GDP. The variable  is the tax
burden on income as a fraction of the GDP. The variable surplusit is the primary surplus of the central
government relative to the GDP, and the variable dit=yit is the debt-to-GDP ratio. All of these values are
expressed as percentages. Dummy variables for the year were included to show the common effects over
time among the countries, t. Time-invariant, country-speciﬁc heterogeneity was captured by ﬁxed-effect,
cross-section dummy variables, "i, with the goal of controlling the effects of institutional, geographic, or
other differences that did not change during the study period.
In the steady-state, with constant ﬁscal variables and without shocks, per capita production grows at
a constant country-speciﬁc rate deﬁned by
gri =





Therefore, the long-term effect that an increase in productive government expenditures has on the
GDP will be deﬁned by





We want to show whether the interactions of xit with the tax burden, debt, and primary surplus are
signiﬁcant in the long-term. Therefore, we should test whether the relationships i=(1  
PT
s=1 s), i =
1;2;3 are signiﬁcant and have the correct sign.
As expected, the dynamic structure of the model itself is such that the use of the least squares method
produces biased and inconsistent estimators. Consistent estimators can be obtained if shocks eit are
serially uncorrelated by using the lagged values of endogenous variables that are not correlated with eit
11Table 1: Baseline Speciﬁcations
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v)
OLS OLS GMM GMM GMM
lags included 4 lags 4 lags 4 lags 4 lags 1 lag
xt 1 -4.49e-06 0.0418 -0.0002? 0.4361? 0.4522?
(-0.35) (0.70) (-3.14) (2.15) (2.62)
dt 1=yt 1 -0.0081?? 0.0107 0.0031
(-1.86) (0.26) (0.10)
xt 1  surplust 1 1.48e-08 1.56e-07? 1.62e-07?
(0.69) (2.15) (2.62)
xt 1  t 1 -1.04e-07 -1.03e-06? -1.07e-06?
(-0.73) (-2.15) (-2.61)
xt 1  (dt 1=yt 1) -0.0001 -0.0011? -0.0011?
(-0.70) (-2.16) (-2.63)
Long-Run Effects
xt 1 -6.05e-06 0.0467 -0.0016 0.3745? 0.3754?
[-0.35] [0.70] [-1.17] [3.32] [3.50]
xt 1  surplust 1 1.65e-08 1.34e-07? 1.34e-07?
[0.69] [2.15] [2.62]
xt 1  t 1 -1.16e-07 -8.87e-07? -8.89e-07?
[-0.73] [-2.12] [-2.58]
xt 1  (dt 1=yt 1) -0.0001 -0.0009? -0.0009?
[-0.71] [-3.35] [-3.52]
Hansen J Stat 11.198 3.322 2.217
p-value [0.1907] [0.5055] [0.8184]
Test of ﬁrst-order
serial autocorrelation -2.10 -1.09 -3.27 0.41 0.64
p-value [0.03] [0.27] [0.001] [0.68] [0.52]
Test of second-order
serial autocorrelation -1.50 -0.34 1.06 1.37 1.09
p-value [0.13] [0.73] [0.28] [0.17] [0.27]
Notes: A full set of year and time dummies were included. t-ratios are in parentheses. z-ratios of tests of the long-run effects, the p-values of the
serial correlation tests and p-values of the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions are in square brackets.
In the GMM speciﬁcations grit 1, xit 1, xit 1 it 1, xit 1 surplusit 1, xit 1 dit 1=yit 1 are treated as endogenous.
The instrument set consists of grit 5, lags 5 and 6 of GDP per capita, lags 2-4 of investment as percentage of GDP, lags 2 and 3 of trade (sum of
exports and imports) as percentage of GDP and lags 2 and 3 of inﬂation.
Signiﬁcance levels ?? 0.10, ? 0.05.
and eit 1 as instrumental variables. In addition, the use of instrumental variables allows for the correction
of the endogeneity of the current values of the ﬁscal variables.
3.1 Pooled Results
Equation (15) was estimated using unbalanced panel data from 74 countries during the period of 1972-
2004. The data for economic growth, GDP, investment as a percentage of GDP, and trade are obtained
fromthePennWorldTables6.3; inﬂationcomesfromtheWorldDevelopmentIndicators(WDIs); produc-
tive expenditures, tax burden, and the primary surplus come from resources at the Government Financial
Statistics (GFS) of the IMF; and the debt-to-GDP ratio is obtained from the Inter-American Development
Bank5.
The results of the estimations for the baseline speciﬁcations that were obtained using pooled annual
5Tables in the Appendix show the names of the included countries and the associated descriptive statistics
12data are shown in Table 1, wherein the slope parameters are imposed to be common to all of the included
countries. In the GMM speciﬁcations grit 1, xit 1, xit 1  it 1, xit 1  surplusit 1, xit 1  dit 1=yit 1
are treated as endogenous. The instrument set consists of grit 5, lags 5 and 6 of the GDP per capita, lags
2-4 of investment as a percentage of the GDP, lags 2 and 3 of trade (sum of exports and imports) as a
percentage of the GDP, and lags 2 and 3 of inﬂation. These variables are among those that have been used
as instrumental variables in similar estimations in the literature, such as in Agell et al. (2006); Bond et al.
(2010); Kneller et al. (1999)6. The validity of these instruments is not rejected by the Sargan-Hansen test
for over-identifying restrictions.
The two ﬁrst columns report the results of the estimations using OLS analysis, with up to four lags
and with and without the interactions of the expenditure variable with the other ﬁscal variables. Columns
three and four depict the results for the same speciﬁcations using a two-step GMM analysis. Various
speciﬁcations using different numbers of maximum lags of the dependent variable, T, were applied. We
consistently found similar results, as shown in the last two columns of the Table, where it is possible to
compare the results of T = 4 and T = 1.
The comparison of the results using OLS and GMM suggests that the results of the OLS considerably
underestimate the degree of the growth rate persistence, and therefore, underestimate the long-term effect
of the ﬁscal variables on growth. For this reason, we will focus on the GMM results. Additionally, the
results demonstrate that the exclusion of the interactions between the productive expenditures and the tax
burden, debt-GDP ratio, and primary surplus lead to omitted variable bias for the expenditure coefﬁcients.
The results without the interactions demonstrate a negative and insigniﬁcant effect on the growth of pro-
ductive expenditures in both the long-term coefﬁcient. Conversely, by including the interactions of ﬁscal
variables, we ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant effect of public expenditures; however, this effect depends on
the values of the other ﬁscal variables in the predicted direction of the theoretical model. Therefore, the
results provide us with some evidence that the data go in the same direction as the proposed results of the
theoretical model.
The size of the effect of productive expenditures on growth was calculated assuming a primary surplus
of -3% and a tax burden of 23%. In this scenario, the marginal effect of an increase in productive expendi-
tures by 1% of the GDP on long-term growth varies from 0.36% to 0.26% for values of the debt-to-GDP
ratio that range between 10% and 120%, as shown in Figure 4. Changes in the values of the tax burden
and the surplus shift this relationship either upwards or downwards; however, given that the coefﬁcients
of these interactions are very small, these shifts do not occur in a perceptible way. This shows that the
interactions with the tax burden and with surplus, although they are signiﬁcant and have the expected di-
rection, are not large. These results suggest that the value of the size of the debt-to-GDP ratio is the most
relevant variable for determining the effect of productive expenditures on growth, as it is quantitatively as
well as statistically signiﬁcant.
6Other estimations using the system-GMM were conducted following an alternative strategy that has been used in the
literature, such as in Bond et al. (2001); Gregoriou and Ghosh (2009), and we found that the results were similar and were
robust for changes in the selection of instrumental variables and in the estimation method; however, once we used the pooled
annual data, the number of time series observations in the panel increases vis-a-vis the number of countries, making system-
GMM an inadequate estimator. Therefore, we opted to pursue an analysis using the same strategy as Bond et al. (2010) and
used a two-step GMM estimator.
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3.2 Results for Mean Group Estimates
In this section, the baseline model was re-estimated while relaxing the hypothesis that the slope parame-
ters are common across countries. If this restriction was invalid, then the inferences that were performed
in the previous sections would also be invalid. The heterogeneity of the parameters among countries
is plausible because the efﬁciency of public expenditures can be different given alternative institutional
conditions. Therefore, given the likely importance of heterogeneous coefﬁcients, we use the Mean Group
Estimatorof PesaranandSmith(1995)andfollowthesamestrategyusedby Bondetal.(2010);Gemmell
et al. (2011); Lee et al. (1997) for growth regressions with a panel that is similar to ours.
In simple terms, the Mean Group Estimator individually estimates the equation (15) using a two-step
GMM, using the same previously used instrument set, for each country using transformed variables by
subtracting the sample mean values for the same year from the original series, to corrects the possible
effects of common shocks, and then obtain the average of the estimated coefﬁcients for the countries.
In our case, we individually obtained the estimated long-term effects for the countries and estimated the
robust means together with their standard errors 7.
Another possible problem for the estimations is the existence of cross-sectional dependence. This oc-
curs if the economic growth of the country affects the growth of other countries, such that the residual eit
would not be independent among countries. This effect is plausible if we believe that there are spillovers
that impact technology and the accumulation of physical or human capital (Conley and Ligon, 2002) or
if the economic development of one country affects the terms of trade of the other countries (Acemoglu
7This is a robust variant of the Mean Group Estimator that is suggested by Bond et al. (2010).
14Table 2: Mean Group Estimates
Long-Run Effects Robust Mean Robust Mean
allowing for
cross-sectional dependence no yes
xt 1 0.0250 0.0225
[0.01] [0.02]
xt 1  surplust 1 7.98e-09 9.10e-09
[0.09] [0.04]
xt 1  t 1 -7.54e-08 -6.99e-08
[0.02] [0.03]
xt 1  (dt 1=yt 1) -0.0001 -0.001
[0.02] [0.01]
Notes: Robust Means are reported. p-values are in square brackets.
All speciﬁcations include grit 1, xit 1, xit 1  it 1, xit 1  surplusit 1, xit 1 
dit 1=yit 1 treated as endogenous. See table 1 for the list of instruments used (here in deviations-
from-means form)
and Ventura, 2002). To correct such a problem, we follow the procedure suggested by Pesaran (2006) of
including the annual average growth of the country as an explanatory variable. This method can also be
seen as a way to include the more ﬂexible tendency of the individual estimations for the countries.
Table 2 depicts the results that were generated by the Mean Group Estimator of the long-term parame-
ters that were estimated from the variables of interest in the model. The columns depict the speciﬁcations
with and without the correction for cross-sectional dependence. The results depict values that are lower
in magnitude for the effect of ﬁscal policy on growth, showing some evidence that the pooled estimations
can show bias by not considering the heterogeneity of the parameters. Even so, all of the long-term coef-
ﬁcients have the same signs that were previously suggested by the theoretical model and are statistically
signiﬁcant. Furthermore, when calculating the marginal effect of productive spending, we obtain that this
effect becomes negative for a debt-GDP ratio above 22.5%.
As a result, we ﬁnd that as more econometric problems are addressed, the effect of public debt on the
relationship between productive government expenditures and economic growth becomes more robust,
corroborating the predictions of the proposed theoretical model.
4 Conclusion
Research that seeks to estimate the effects of ﬁscal policy on economic growth has ignored the role of
public debt in this relationship. This paper proposed a theoretical model of endogenous growth in which
the level of the public debt-to-GDP ratio can negatively affect the effect that productive public expen-
ditures have on growth. Therein, the main conclusions of the theoretical model were tested through an
econometric model to provide evidence for the validity of this conclusion. Our empirical analysis controls
for time-invariant, country-speciﬁc heterogeneity in the growth rates. We also address endogeneity issues
and allow for heterogeneity across countries in model parameters and for cross-sectional dependences.
Our approach has enabled us to verify the effects that have already been predicted in the literature,
such as the non-linear effects of productive expenditures on growth given the size of the tax burden,
15such as in Barro (1990), or given the indebtedness rate. Such effects represent negative consequences in
terms of direct capital accumulation, as they lead to diminishing marginal net returns of capital or savings
extracted from the economy to ﬁnance pubic expenditures.
In addition to the above effects, we were able to observe an additional effect, wherein the impact
that productive expenditures have on growth depends on the size of the debt-to-GDP ratio. This occurs
because an increase in the magnitude of productive expenditures leads to an increase in the productivity
of the economy, and thus, to an equilibrium of interest rates, as there is no decreasing marginal return
for aggregate capital in the endogenous growth models. This increase in interest rates leads to higher
government spending from debt servicing, such that as the size of the debt increases, so does the impact
from this increase on interest rates. This is why a higher debt-to-GDP ratio corresponds to a smaller
impact of productive expenditures on economic growth.
We can also understand this effect as an income transfer between generations, speciﬁcally, from the
younger generation, which has a portion of its savings invested in government securities, thus decreasing
capital accumulation in order to pay the interest on the debt of the older generation, which does not save.
In this sense, the observed effect is similar to that of the pay-as-you-go pension system in overlapping of
generation models, where income is transferred between generations and decreases the accumulation of
capital.
In addition to incorporating the effect of public debt on the relationship between productive expen-
ditures and economic growth, the model also demonstrates that increases in the size of the debt can lead
to greater economic growth, since the status quo is a healthy ﬁscal situation and indebtedness is associ-
ated with an increase in productive expenditures. This runs contrary to previous models, in which debt
increases always lead to decreased growth. This result shows that changes in the public debt can be
Pareto optimal, leading to beneﬁts for all generations, which is quite different from that suggested by
endogenous models of debt, where expenditures are always unproductive.
Using the econometric speciﬁcations that were derived from the theoretical model, the main con-
clusions of the model can be established. In particular, it is clear that the omission of the interactions
between productive expenditures and the tax burden, primary surplus, and public debt, can be a source of
bias in the estimation of the effects of ﬁscal policies on growth. The results suggest that the size of the
debt-to-GDP ratio is the most relevant variable in determining the effect of productive expenditures on
growth, as it was found to be both quantitatively and statistically signiﬁcant. Various econometric prob-
lems were addressed, wherein our ﬁndings suggest that as more econometric problems are addressed,
the effect of public debt on the relationship between productive government expenditures and economic
growth becomes more robust.
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18Table 3: Descriptive Statistics (%)
Median Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max.
Per Capita GDP Growth 2.50 2.27 5.6 -41.11 56.40
Productive Expenditures / GDP 7.35 8.33 4.03 0.90 30.84
Income Tax / GDP 5.46 6.71 4.63 0.47 27.88
Surplus / GDP -3.15 -3.93 6.18 -61.14 62.18
Debt / GDP 44.07 56.75 58.19 0.38 637.52
Table 4: List of Countries
South Africa Mauricio Slovenia
Germany Spain Mexico









Bulgaria Czech Republic Honduras
Burundi Rwanda Hungary
Bhutan Yemen Senegal






Costa Rica Latvia Tunisia
Luxembourg Denmark Turkey
Egypt Maldives Uruguay
El Salvador Zambia Malta
Slovakia Morocco
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